GoldBod cannot escape accountability despite agency status – Afenyo-Markin demands full transparency on gold losses

Ghana's Minority Leader and Effutu Member of Parliament, Alexander Afenyo-Markin, has firmly rejected suggestions that the Gold Board (GoldBod) can use accounting technicalities or its agent relationship with the Bank of Ghana to evade accountability for substantial losses in the country's gold trading operations. Speaking at a parliamentary press conference on Tuesday, August 18, Mr Afenyo-Markin argued that an institution managing billions of cedis in public funds must remain answerable for how it executes its mandate, regardless of its formal classification.

The accountability argument

Mr Afenyo-Markin acknowledged that GoldBod could claim it purchased gold solely as an agent of the central bank, but he contended this arrangement does not eliminate the institution's operational responsibility. "Gold Board is entitled to make the accounting point that it was purchasing gold on behalf of the Bank of Ghana. But agency does not extinguish operational responsibility," he stated. He emphasised that any agent entrusted with managing public resources must be held to account for the quality of its execution and the decisions made in carrying out its duties.

The Minority Leader's position reflects growing scrutiny of the gold trading programme, which has reportedly resulted in substantial losses. Mr Afenyo-Markin called for GoldBod to provide comprehensive details on multiple aspects of its operations, including the prices paid for gold and the methodology used to determine those prices. He also demanded disclosure of any premiums paid to secure gold supplies, explanations for how international off-takers were selected, and details of the discounts at which gold was subsequently sold.

Additionally, Mr Afenyo-Markin sought clarity on how much GoldBod earned through service and asset charges on Bank of Ghana-financed transactions, which commercial and transactional risks the institution assumed, and what internal controls were established to protect the central bank from losses.

Structural concerns and moral hazard

One of Mr Afenyo-Markin's key concerns centres on what he describes as a potential moral hazard embedded in the current arrangement. Under the existing structure, GoldBod earns transaction-based income for purchasing, weighing, grading, assaying, and exporting gold, whilst the Bank of Ghana bears the underlying trading losses. This setup, he argued, could incentivise the institution to increase transaction volumes regardless of whether those transactions ultimately create value for the financier.

"If an institution earns transaction-based income for purchasing, assaying, and aggregating gold, while the financier bears the underlying trading losses, then increasing transaction volumes may increase the agent's revenue, even where the overall programme destroys value for the principal," Mr Afenyo-Markin stated. He called for an immediate investigation into whether the incentive structure encouraged excessive transaction volumes, inadequate pricing discipline, or insufficient attention to controlling trading costs.

Why it matters for Ghana

The reported losses from Ghana's gold trading operations represent a significant drain on public resources at a time when the country faces fiscal pressures. Gold is one of Ghana's most valuable export commodities, and any programme managing these strategic resources must operate with the highest standards of transparency and accountability. The Minority's demands reflect broader concerns about how state agencies manage public funds and whether institutional arrangements inadvertently create misaligned incentives that harm the national interest.

Mr Afenyo-Markin also rejected suggestions that concerns about the programme could be addressed simply by pointing to GoldBod's reported surplus, emphasising that a single positive metric does not excuse the overall losses or absolve the institution of the need for comprehensive accountability.

• Full disclosure of gold pricing methodology and premiums paid
• Investigation into whether transaction incentives drove excessive volumes and losses
• Complete transparency on service charges and internal control mechanisms