Ghana's Constitutional Review Must Strengthen Accountability Safeguards, Critics Warn

Ghana's ongoing constitutional review has reopened critical questions about how effectively the country's institutions control public money and power. More than three decades after adoption of the 1992 Constitution, accountability remains inconsistent—audit irregularities persist, asset declarations lack transparency, and political influence over state-owned enterprises continues unchecked. As the Constitutional Review Committee and Government Position Paper shape proposals for reform, experts are pressing for changes that would entrench genuine independence for oversight bodies rather than leaving them vulnerable to political pressure.

The Accountability Gap in Practice

Ghana has established substantial public financial management legislation and important oversight institutions on paper. However, implementation reveals significant weaknesses. Audits are conducted but recommendations often go unenforced. Officials file asset declarations, but disclosure remains opaque. State-owned enterprises operate under government direction that prioritises political objectives over transparent governance. The gap between constitutional design and real-world accountability undermines public trust and leaves room for resource misuse.

A core problem lies in how oversight institutions relate to the political authorities they must examine. When appointment power, budget control, tenure security and enforcement authority all flow from the same political centre—typically the Presidency—even well-intentioned officials face pressure to moderate their scrutiny. Independence cannot rest on individual integrity alone; it must be embedded in constitutional structure.

Proposed Reforms: Independence and Enforcement

The Constitutional Review Committee has recommended several important safeguards. For the Auditor-General's office, proposals include requiring the officeholder to be a qualified professional accountant, limiting service to a single non-renewable term and providing strong removal protection. Government has accepted these recommendations, which would reduce dependence on the appointing authority.

However, qualification and tenure alone will not guarantee effectiveness. Ghana must also address transparent selection processes, budget autonomy independent of executive approval, guaranteed parliamentary access to audit information, and robust follow-through mechanisms when irregularities are identified. An audit report that sits unimplemented serves no accountability function; the cycle must include parliamentary hearings, timely recovery actions, sanctions where appropriate and demonstrable control improvements.

The relationship between Parliament and the Executive requires parallel reform. Article 78 currently allows Ministers to be drawn from Parliament, creating incentives that can weaken legislative scrutiny—lawmakers may hesitate to challenge government they may soon join. The Committee proposes barring MPs from ministerial appointment, whilst Government prefers removing the constitutional minimum for parliamentary Ministers, leaving numbers to presidential discretion. Without genuine separation between legislative oversight and executive delivery, Parliamentary accountability becomes compromised regardless of how many Ministers come from the legislature.

Why It Matters for Ghana

Constitutional accountability mechanisms directly affect whether public resources reach their intended beneficiaries or disappear into corruption. Weak oversight has contributed to infrastructure projects that run over budget, health facilities that lack essential supplies, and education programmes that fail to achieve results—all consequences of undetected misuse or mismanagement of funds.

Ghana's international standing also depends on demonstrable governance. Development partners, investors and rating agencies assess institutional strength when deciding whether to support the country. A constitution that strengthens genuine accountability—rather than merely creating impressive-sounding institutions—enhances Ghana's credibility and attractiveness for partnership.

For ordinary Ghanaians, the stakes are practical. When public money disappears due to weak oversight, government services deteriorate whilst taxpayer burden may increase. When officials face no real consequences for misconduct, public trust erodes and the incentive to comply with rules weakens throughout the system. Constitutional reform that cements genuine accountability—through secure tenure for oversight officials, protected budgets, mandatory parliamentary access to information and enforceable consequences—directly serves citizens' interests in effective, honest governance.

The debate between the Constitutional Review Committee and Government ultimately reflects different visions of how much independence oversight institutions truly need. The Committee emphasises entrenchment of core safeguards in the Constitution itself, with legislation handling technical detail. Government leans toward flexibility through ordinary law. Both approaches have merit, but the principle must be clear: oversight bodies cannot be reliably independent if their survival depends on the good will of the authorities they scrutinise.