Ghana's Tribunals Bill: Legal expert Bentil argues for court reform over new institutions

A prominent Ghanaian constitutional law expert has challenged the government's approach to establishing special tribunals, arguing that the country should prioritise reforming its existing court system rather than creating parallel judicial institutions.

Frank Bentil, a respected legal scholar and commentator, contends that just because something is constitutionally permissible does not mean it should be pursued. He emphasises that policymakers must distinguish between what the Constitution allows and what is genuinely beneficial for Ghana's justice system.

The core argument

Bentil's critique centres on a philosophical principle: constitutional authority alone should not drive policy decisions. While Ghana's Constitution may grant Parliament the power to establish tribunals, he argues this power must be exercised thoughtfully, with careful consideration of its impact on judicial efficiency and the rule of law.

His position reflects broader concerns within Ghana's legal community about fragmentation of the court system. Multiple institutions handling overlapping jurisdictions can lead to delays, inconsistency in rulings, and undermine public confidence in justice delivery.

Why it matters for Ghana

Ghana's courts already face significant backlogs and resource constraints. The judiciary has long struggled with case delays, inadequate funding, and staffing shortages that affect citizens' access to justice. Creating additional tribunals without addressing these underlying systemic problems could worsen rather than improve the situation.

The issue resonates with broader governance debates in Ghana. Questions about institutional efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and whether new bodies address root causes—or merely add bureaucratic layers—are central to how government spending is scrutinised by civil society and parliament.

Furthermore, tribunal bills often spark controversy around issues like accountability, appeals procedures, and whether their operations maintain constitutional standards. Ghanaians have legitimate interest in ensuring any judicial reform strengthens rather than weakens the independence and effectiveness of the courts.

The path forward

Bentil's argument implicitly advocates for a more strategic approach: before establishing new institutions, Ghana should conduct thorough assessments of what the existing system needs. This might include adequate funding, infrastructure improvements, judicial training, technology upgrades, and staffing that would benefit both regular courts and any specialised bodies.

His position does not necessarily reject tribunals entirely, but rather demands that they be justified by demonstrated need rather than constitutional possibility. Other democracies have successfully created specialised tribunals—such as those handling commercial disputes, tax matters, or administrative cases—but only after strengthening foundational judicial capacity.

The debate reflects a mature questioning of governance approaches in Ghana: does policymaking follow evidence and careful analysis, or does it merely exercise available constitutional powers without sufficient justification? As Parliament continues to deliberate on tribunals legislation, voices like Bentil's serve to ensure that decisions prioritise the actual interests of Ghanaians seeking justice.